Preparation and Argument of the Criminal Appeal by Magidson, Sherman C.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 62 | Issue 2 Article 4
1971
Preparation and Argument of the Criminal Appeal
Sherman C. Magidson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sherman C. Magidson, Preparation and Argument of the Criminal Appeal, 62 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 173 (1971)
THE JomirL or CnaNArL LAw, Cmrrxo oGY AND POLIcE ScN.cE
Copyright 0 1971 by Northwestern University School of Law
PREPARATION AD ARGUMENT OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL
SHERMAN C. MAGIDSON*
The successful criminal appeal is most often
shaped by the diligent, articulate, able trial lawyer
who recognizes constitutional, procedural and
substantive problems as they occur in the prepara-
tion and trial of a case and who protects his record
in the assumption that the case will subsequently
be appealed. This is not always true, of course,
for many cases are won on appeal despite the
conduct of the trial attorney,' and others, originally
lost on appeal, are eventually won at some later
date in the course of pursuing one or more post
conviction remedies.2 Generally, however, these
latter proceedings are handled by the same at-
torneys who prosecuted the initial action for post-
conviction relief at the trial stage and who, by
reason of that fact, have prepared their case for
appeal from the moment of filing the petition
seeking relief. In a sense, these cases are being
appealed even in the trial court,3 and, while they
may present the same mechanical and procedural
problems as an appeal from the original judgment
of conviction, when they reach the appellate stage,
they generally do not present the same conceptual
problems. That distinction defines the scope of this
article, which is primarily limited to problems
arising in the course of an appeal from a judgment
of conviction.
The rules of procedure or statutory provisions
governing appeals are of cardinal importance, for
not only do they outline basic procedures and
requirements, but quite often they signal major
pitfalls. As a consequence, primary emphasis will
be placed on the Federal Rides of Appellate Pro-
cedure which govern appellate practice in each of
* A.B. Yale University; 3.D. Northwestern Uni-
versity; Partner, Bellows, Bellows & Magidson, Chi-
cago; Member, Illinois Bar.
I See, e.g., People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.
2d 239 (1957).2 In chronological order the controversial murder
case involving James Witherspoon occasioned the
following decisions: People v. Witherspoon, 27 Ill.2d
483, 190 N.E.2d 281 (1963); United States ex re.
Witherspoon v. Ogilvie, 337 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 950 (1964); People v. Wither-
spoon, 36 1ll.2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967), rev'd.,
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2 Cf., People v. Lurie, 39 Ill.2d 331, 235 N.E.2d 637(1968).
the eleven federal circuits4 and most closely ap-
proximate the rules in force in the individual
states. To augment this model, reference will also
be made to the rules of procedure governing appeals
in criminal cases in Illinois courts, 5 and, on oc-
casion, to rules or provisions in other jurisdictions
which represent a significant departure from
federal and Illinois practice.
REAcmNG TEx REvIEwING COuRT
The most common method of initiating an appeal
is by "notice of appeal." I This one-page document,
standardized as to form in many jurisdictions,7 is
the keystone of the entire appellate process: it is
the only jurisdictional step in the process of appeal.8
Thus the statutes or rules must be consulted to
determine the number of days following judgment
within which the notice of appeal must be filed.9
This in itself is not always an easy task. "Judg-
ment" in this context means judgment on the
verdict (or finding) and sentence.'0 Sometimes,
however, a trial court will enter judgment, sentence
the defendant and then allow time for the filing of
post-trial motions. The question then arises as to
when the time for filing the notice of appeal has
commenced to run.
In jurisdictions which follow such a practice, the
time for filing notice of appeal is usually computed
from the date upon which post-trial motions are
denied.n There is, of course, good common sense
as well as solid legal reasoning behind this. It is
most commonly held that the filing of a notice of
4 28 U.S.C.A. Hereinafter cited as FED. R. App. P. ..
5 IiL. R.v. STAT. ch. 110A (1967). Hereinafter cited
IrL. S. Cr. R. -
6 FED. R. App. P. 3; Ir. S. CT. R. 606.7See, e.g., Form 1, Appendix to Forms, FED. R.
Aip. P.; IrL. S. CT. R. 606(d).8 See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 3 (a); IrL. S. CT. R. 606(a).
9 FED. R. A p. P. 4(b) (10 days); CAr.. R. App. P.
31(a) (West 1964), (10 days); Iri. S. CT. R. 606(b)
(30 days); N.Y. CODE OF Cn r. P. § 521 (30 days).
10Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937); cf.
People v. Adams, 73 Ill. App. 2d 1, 220 N.E.2d 17
(1962), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 443 (1967); see generally,
8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37.05 (Cipes ed.
1968).
"See, e.g., FED. R. Ap. P. 4(b); Committee Com-
ments, Rule 37(a)(3), FED. R. Camm. P.; cf., Ir.. S. Cr.
R. 606(b).
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appeal divests the trial court of all but extra-
ordinary jurisdiction in the case.12 Compelling a
defendant to file his notice of appeal prior to a
ruling on his post-trial motions would deprive the
trial court of authority to rule on those motions.
Even if the court retained jurisdiction under these
circumstances, there would seem to be little sense
in requiring that a defendant take his case to the
reviewing court (and incur whatever expenses are
charged for the filing of a notice of appeal)"3 as
long as the possibility exists that the trial court will
correct those errors brought to its attention by the
post-trial motions. This anomaly is avoided by
computing the time for filing the notice of appeal
from the date of denial of the post-trial motions (or
the date of the judgment) whichever occurs last.14
Rule 4(b) of the federal rules allows some
flexibility for late filing. Under such circumstances,
the trial court is authorized to extend the time for
filing "for a period not to exceed 30 days from the
expiration of the time otherwise prescribed...."
Although 4(b) does allow for the tardy filing of a
notice of appeal "upon a showing of excusable
neglect," 15 counsel, especially retained counsel,
"See United States v. Comulada, 340 F.2d 449, 452
(2d Cir. 1965); People v. Meyers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220
N.E.2d 297 (1966); People v. DeMarino, 72 Ill. App.
2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 132 (1966). The trial court still re-
tains jurisdiction to hear and determine issues raised
by a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. But under federal practice, in order to grant
a new trial pending appeal, the case must be remanded
by the reviewing court. FED. R. CRns. P. 33; 8 J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE § 33.03(2) (Cipes ed. 1968).
"Five dollars in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No charge is made in the Illinois Circuit Courts.
14 FED. R. App. P. 4(b). Considerable confusion under
the pre-1966 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
caused by the language of former Rule 37. That rule
made it appear as though even an untimely motion
for a new trial [such a motion must be filed within
seven days after a verdict or finding as per FED. R.
CRm. P. 33] filed before the expiration of the ten-day
period for filing notice of appeal, extended the time
for such notice to be filed. See Smith v. United States,
273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959); contra, Lott v. United
States, 280 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 367 U.S. 421 (1961). In Lottv. United States,
367 U.S. 421 (1961), the Supreme Court avoided an-
swering whether Rule 37 presupposed that post-trial
motions filed pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 would be
timely, stating that it preferred to leave the question
"for resolution by the rule-making process." Id. at
425. Rule 37 was amended in 1966 and unquestionably
establishes that the time for filing a notice of appeal
will be automatically extended only by the filing of
timely post-trial motions. Rule 4(b) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure embodies this amend-
ment.
15 FED. R. App. P. 4(b); cf. ILL. S. CT. R. 606(c)-
upon showing of "reasonable excuse for failure to file a
cannot rely too heavily on this provision, for it
obviously is intended to afford relief only upon a
showing of nonculpability.16
In states such as Illinois, where appeals in
criminal cases are taken either to the supreme court
or to an intermediate appellate court (depending on
the nature of the claims made in the appeal or on
whether a death sentence has been imposed), 7
counsel must consult the rules of practice and the
applicable constitutional provisions in order to
determine the court to which the notice of appeal
should be directed. The criteria for making this
determination vary in the different states having
intermediate courts of review,"8 and failure to meet
these criteria, although not necessarily fatal to the
appeal, may result in delay and some embarrass-
ment.
Provisions for appeal by notice of appeal desig-
nate the place where such notice should be filed.
Filing the notice is the jurisdictional step in appeal,
and not all jurisdictions allow late filings.' 9 Hence,
it is essential that counsel accurately determine
where the notice should be filed. Federal and
Illinois law'0 direct that it be filed with the clerk
of the trial court; and the federal decisions have
declared that any document mailed to the trial
court and manifesting an intention to appeal shall
be considered as the requisite notice."
Other jurisdictions have not been so liberal,
however, and have required a more complicated
procedure in filing. In Vermont prior to 1961, for
example, an appellant was required to file his
notice of appeal with both the clerk of the trial
court and the clerk of the court to which the appeal
was being taken." In State v. Brown,"2 the appellant
directed a letter to the clerk of the trial court
notice of appeal on time, accompanied by the proposed
notice of appeal, filed in the reviewing court within six
months of the expiration of the time for filing a notice
of appeal, the reviewing court may grant leave to
appeal and order the clerk to transmit the notice of
appeal to the trial court for filing." Contra, 12 VT.
STAT. AN. § 252.
16 Cf. United States v. Meyers, 406 F.2d 1015 (4th
Cir. 1969).
'7I. CONsT art. VI, §5; ILL. S. CT. R. 603. cf.,
ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, §4 of the new Illinois Constitution.18 See, e.g., BuRus IND. STAT. Am. Title 4, § 214
(all criminal cases reviewed in Supreme Court); Mo.
CosT. art. V, § 3 (all felonies reviewed in Supreme
Court).
"9 See, e.g., 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 252.
20 FED. R. App. P. 3(a); I. S. CT. R. 606(a).
2"See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
442, n. 5 (1962).
12 VT. STAT. ANx. § 2382 (1960).
" 121 Vt. 459, 160 A.2d 879 (1960).
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advising him that he was aware the time for filing
a notice of appeal was "fast approaching"; he also
filed a timely notice of appeal with the "Clerk of
the Supreme Court, Montepelier, Vermont."
In dismissing the appeal, the state supreme court
ruled that the appellant had not filed his notice
with the proper supreme court clerk and that the
communication to the clerk of the trial court (who
was also the "proper" clerk of the supreme court
to which a notice should have been addressed) did
not, in any event, constitute a notice -of appeal.
Within the year the Vermont Legislature amended
the statute to provide for filing only with the clerk
of the trial court.U
It is evident that if trial counsel does pot file the
notice of appeal, it becomes the responsibility of
appellate counsel. In Illinois, the trial judge, at the
time of entering judgment in a felony case is re-
quired by statute25 to advise a defendant of his
right to appeal even where the defendant has
pleaded guilty. Moreover, a notice of appeal must
automatically be filed by the clerk of the court in a
case where the death penalty has been imposed.26
With the appeal filed, an appropriate "record"
must be prepared. The record, representing the
written history of the case in the trial court, is
comprised of three basic parts: the pleadings and
motions filed and orders entered; z2 the report of
proceedings in the trial court;ss and the exhibits,
both admitted and refused. 2 In practice, the ex-
peditious and successful compilation of the record,
while the obligation of the appellant," is the
product of professional cooperation among defense
counsel, prosecution and trial court clerk. The job
24 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2382 (1961).
" ILL. S. CT. R. 605. See People v. Sanders, 40 Ill.
2d 458, 240 N.E.2d 627 (1968). FED. R. Cums. P.
32(a)(2), limited to cases which have gone to trial on a
plea of not guilty.
21 IL. S. CT. R. 606(a).
27Popularly called the "common law record" in
Illinois, People v. Johnson, 15 fll.2d 244, 154 N.E.2d
274 (1958), and "original papers" under the Federal
Rules. FED. R. App. P. 10(a).
2 Sometimes called a "bill of exceptions" and a
"transcript of proceedings" in Illinois, People v. John-
son, 15 Ill.2d 244, 154 N.E.2d 274 (1958), but now
called a "report of proceedings." ILL. S. CT. R. 608(a)
and (b). Called a "transcript of proceedings" in the
Federal Rules. FED. R. App. P. 10(a) and (b).29 FED. R. App. P. 10(a). In Illinois, the exhibits are
part of the Report of Proceedings. ILL. S. CT. R. 608(b).
Defense counsel will not, of course, want to include
rejected prosecution exhibits, but an experienced prose-
cutor will be alert to the benefits he can obtain byhaving those exhibits included in the record.
0 RED. R. App. P. 11(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 608(a).
is as difficult and complicated as these parties
make it.
It is the appellant's obligation to advise the clerk
of the trial court, within a certain period of time
after filing the notice of appeal, exactly what
portions of the pleadings, orders, proceedings and
exhibits he wants included in the record and
certified to the reviewing court." This "designation"
or "praecipe" not only directs the clerk what to
prepare and certify, but also serves to advise the
state what the record will contain.3 This latter ad-
vice, of course, gives the state an opportunity to
designate other items which it wants included in
the record.13
A practical method in preparing the record
requires the parties to stipulate to its contents0U
This practice has the obvious advantage of saving
the clerk both the time and effort he would other-
wise spend in collating individual designations.
Should the parties not designate or agree on the
composition of the record, the clerk will prepare
31 ILL. S. CT. R. 608(a). The Federal Rules do not
contain any equivalent provision requiring a designa-
tion, although Rule 10(b) does permit the parties tofile an agreed:
statement of the case showing how the issues pre-
sented by the appeal arose and were decided by the
district court and setting forth only so many of thefacts averred and proved or sought to be proved
as are essential to a decision of the issues pre-
sented.
The statement must be approved by the trial court, and
then certified to the court of appeals as the record on
appeal. This procedure clearly envisages dispensing
with the transcript of proceedings as well as the originalpapers. In criminal cases it might be effectively used
where a limited issue, such as the validity of a search
warrant, will be presented. Despite the absence of a
provision which enables the parties to reduce the con-
tents of the record to specific papers relevant to the
issues on appeal, it is the practice in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for
the parties to stipulate to the contents of the record,
thus accomplishing what is intended by Illinois Rule
608(a).
The term "praecipe" is a carry-over from the com-
mon law writ of error practice. Cf. ILL. S. CT. R. 322.
It is synonymous with the statutory term "designa-
tion."
z
3 IL.. S. CT. R. 608(a). Cf. FED. R. App. P. 10(b),
which imposes a duty on the defendant to advise the
government of a "description of the parts of the tran-
script (of proceedings) which he intends to include in
the record and a statement of the issues he intends to
present on the appeal." Within ten days the govern-
ment may demand that the defendant include other
relevant portions of the transcript and, in the event of
a dispute, apply to the trial court for an order requiring
the defendant to do so.
3ILL. S. CT. R. 608(a); cf. FED. R. App. P. 10(d).
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and certify the entire file as the record.35 While this
method has the virtue of simplicity and safety,
it has the vice of causing added expense and effort.
A crucial portion of the appellate record is the
transcript by which the reviewing court is advised
of the words that were spoken at the various
hearings-including the trial-which culminated in
the judgment. It need not be completely verbatim;
it need not even be a stenographic transcript. It
may be prepared by stipulation of the parties,38
by the recollections of bystanders,n or by the
memory of the appellant subject to the trial court's
reconciliation of state objections.n Without this
"transcript" the defendant cannot question the
sufficiency of evidence to support either the judg-
ment or various orders entered, and cannot raise
errors occurring in the proceedings below.39 The
most common form of a report of proceedings,
however, is the stenographic transcript.40 With this
in mind, many of the problems which perplex
lawyers preparing their first appeal may be ex-
amined.
As previously noted, it is not necessary to include
a full transcript in the record. Comprehending this,
counsel can save the reporter a great deal of time in
preparation of the transcript, his client a great deal
of money in purchasing it and the reviewing court
the labor of examining too bulky a record. The sole
necessity is that the transcript accurately portray
those portions of the proceedings necessary to a
complete understanding of the issues to be raised
on appeal. Should the appellant decide, then, to
omit a portion of the transcript, the appellee
should be given fair notice and an opportunity to
3 FED. R. APP. P. 10(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 608(a). By
exclusion in Illinois, by the Rule in the Tenth Circuit(10th Cir. R. 8) and by implication in the other circuits,
this does not include subpoenas, trial briefs and like
documents..... 
- .36 ILL. S. CT. R. 323(d). See supra note 40, regarding
practice under Rule 10(d) of the Federal Rules.37 FED. R. APP. P. 10(c); ILL. S. CT. R. 323(c); see
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 14 n. 4 (1956).
8 FED. R. App. P. 10(c); ILL. S. CT. R. 323(c). For
procedure regarding settlement of incorrect or disputed
records and transcripts, see FED. R. APP. P. 10(e); ILL.
S. CT. R. 323(c) & 329.
9 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-15 (1956).4 0 Indeed, because of the decisions in Griffin and
Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969), it is
impossible to conceive of any criminal case being ap-
pealed without a full transcript of the evidence.41 Official Court Reporters in Illinois are authorized
to charge not in excess of twenty-five cents per one
hundred words for a report of proceedings in a criminal
case. IL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 655 (1967).
supplement the record with those additional por-
tions it deems necessary.'
Once counsel decides how much of the proceed-
ings are to be included in the transcript, he must
bear in mind that almost all jurisdictions have a.
time limit, commencing with the filing of the notice
of appeal, within which the transcript must be
filed with the clerk of the trial court,3 or certified
and approved by the trial judge." In some juris-
dictions, failure to take this step within the time
allotted proves fatal to an appellant's intentions of
having issues covered in the transcript heard'
However, rules generally provide extensions of
time for filing (certifying) the transcript.46
Exhibits are another essential part of the
record,0 and as a matter of policy should be made
available for the reviewing court's consideration.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure so
provide,4 except for "documents of unusual bulk
or weight and physical exhibits other than docu-
ments... ." ,,49 But many appellate attorneys,
4
2FEn. R. APr. P. 10(b); IL. S. CT. R. 608(b) pro-
vides:
[tihe report of proceedings contains the testimony
and exhibits, the rulings of the trial judge, and all
other proceedings before the trial judge, unless the
parties designate or stipulate for less.
43 In Illinois the report of proceeding must be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within forty-nine days
after the filing of the notice of appeal (or, if a death
sentence has been imposed, within forty-nine days from
the date of that sentence). IL. S. CT. R. 608(b). The
Federal Rules contain no statement as to when the
transcript must be filed with the clerk of the trial court,
but do require the defendant to order the transcript
from the reporter within ten days after filing the notice
of appeal. FED. R. App. P. 10(b).
44See, e.g., TEXAs CODE OF Cpmi. P. art. 40.09(7).
Neither the Federal nor the Illinois Rules require that
the trial judge certify or approve the transcript, al-
though Illinois does require that it be certified by the
court reporter or the trial judge. ILL. S. CT. R. 608 (b).
41 See, e.g., TExAs CODE Or Cami. P. art. 40.09(7).46 fIL. S. CT. R. 608(d). The extension may be
granted by the trial judge or reviewing court if made
either before the expiration of the time for filing or
within thirty-five days afterwards upon "a showing of
reasonable excuse for failure to file the motion earlier."
By implication, motions made within the thirty-five
days and not supported by a showing of reasonable ex-
cuse, or made beyond the thirty-five day period of
grace, cannot be granted. The appellant then will have
missed his opportunity to have issues covered by the
transcript heard on appeal. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 13-15 (1956).4 FD. R. App. P. 10(a); ILL. S. Cr. R. 608(b). The
latter rule makes the exhibits part of the report of pro-
ceedings, and according to the Committee Comments,
they must be incorporated therein for consideration by
the reviewing court.
48 FED. R. App. P. 11(a); see also note 56 infra for
Illinois practice.
4 FED. R. App. P. 11(b).
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perhaps because trial counsel had the prescience to
read his exhibits into the record, fail to follow
through to make sure that the material exhibits are
included in the record on appeal. An even greater
number of appellate attorneys fail to make an
attempt to have rejected defense exhibits included
in the record. These are serious mistakes.
While trial counsel may have read his pertinent
exhibits into the record, the possibility may still
exist that some portion of an exhibit, the signifi-
cance of which could not have been appreciated at
the time, was not so read. This possibility alone
warrants the slight added effort necessary to insure
that the exhibits themselves are transmitted. And,
contrary to the apparent philosophy of the Federal
Rules,"0 this is especially so with respect to "docu-
ments of unusual bulk" whose very existence sug-
gests a case of unusual complexity in which such
documents may provide crucial material on appeal.
Rejected exhibits are seldom the subject of an
offer of proof which describes their contents ver-
batim. Yet these documents are even more essential
to the appeal. Their rejection might prove erro-
neous, and may have even greater significance for
the resolution of other issues. Assuming that
criteria for certification of these documents by the
trial court and acceptance by the reviewing court
can be met," counsel should make every effort to
have these rejected exhibits made part of the
record. If that fails he should be ever alert to
possible indirect use of the exhibits.
Such a tactic was employed in People v. Cullotta,n
where trial counsel made no explicit offer of proof.
Counsel at the initial stage of the appellate pro-
ceedings was unable to include in the record a copy
of rejected exhibit, a prior inconsistent statement
by a key witness for the prosecution. As a result,
the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction
without considering the affect of the impeaching
document.0 New counsel petitioned the Illinois
Supreme Court for leave to appeal, and thereby
questioned the rejection of the exhibit and the
sufficiency of the evidence. In arguing the latter
issue, appellant attacked the veracity of the wit-
ness, a police officer, who had testified that a
co-defendant had implicated the appellant as his
50 See FED. R. APp. P. I1(b).61See FFD. R. App. P. 10(e); Ix.. S. CT. R. 323(c)
and 329.
0 32 I11.2d 502, 207 N.E.2d 444 (1956), rev'ing. 48
Ill. App. 2d 180, 198 N.E.2d 748 (1964).
People v. Cullotta, 48 Ill. App. 2d 180, 198 N.E.2d
748 (1964).
accomplice while being questioned at the scene of
the crime. This evidence was admitted in rebuttal
of testimony by the co-defendant exonerating the
appellant. The attack focused on the assumed lack
of content of the rejected statement, the officer's
report, and the officer's admission that it contained
everything the co-defendant had told him. Without
the document, but because "... . the clear purport
of the record... [was] that the statement made no
reference.., to defendant's participation in the
crime" " the Illinois Supreme Court pointedly
disregarded the officer's testimony in reversing the
conviction.
The entire record should be filed in the reviewing
court within a certain time after filing the notice of
appeal.55 As with the transcript of proceedings,
extensions of time for doing this are available from
either the trial court or the reviewing court,56
although some jurisdictions limit the number of
days a trial court may extend this period.7 In such
a case application must be made to the reviewing
court for the extension.
When the record has not been fully prepared
within the time alloted, an appellate court may
allow the filing of a "short record." " The short
record generally consists of the indictment, other
motions or orders germane to the relief sought, the
judgment order and the notice of appeal filed. 9
"People v. Cullotta, 32 Ill.2d 502, 207 N.E.2d 444,
446 (1965).
55Under the Federal Rules the record must be
docketed in the reviewing court within forty days after
the filing of the notice of appeal, unless the time is other-
wise extended or shortened. FED. R. App. P. 11(a). In
Illinois the record, or a certificate of the clerk of the
trial court attesting that the record has been prepared
and certified in the form required for transmission to the
reviewing court (IrL. S. CT. R. 325), must be filed within
sixty-three days after the filing of the notice of appeal,
or fourteen days after the filing of the report of proceed-
ings, whichever date occurs last. ILL. S. CT. R. 608(c).
66 FED. R. App. P. 11(d); InL. S. CT. R. 608(d). See
also FED. R. App. P. 12(a) and (c) concerning the powers
of the courts of appeal to permit an appeal to be dock-
eted out of time and to dismiss an untimely transmitted
(or docketed) appeal.
5Under the Federal Rules the district court may not
extend the time for filing to a date more than ninety
days from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal.
FED. R. App. P. 11(d).
53 ILL. S. CT. R. 328. Cf. FED. R. App. P. 11(g).
"See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 328. The short record may
be authenticated by the certificate of the clerk of the
trial court, or by the affidavit of the attorney or party
filing it. Thus, where it becomes necessary to file an
emergency motion in the reviewing court to obtain for
example bail pending appeal after the trial court has
denied bail, the appellant need not suffer a delay while
he waits for the clerk of the trial court to prepare the
short record. He may file his own copies of the necessary
1971]
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This record suffices in bringing the case before the
court. With the matter docketed, the reviewing
court may then extend the time for filing the
complete record.
This same concept may be used to explain pro-
cedures for augmenting a record already filed,
when, through inadvertence, items that should
have been included were not. As a reviewing court
has obvious jurisdiction to allow the complete
record to be submitted after the filing of a short
record, so it has the power to permit additions to be
made to the record even after a purportedly
complete one has been filed. Moreover, under the
federal and Illinois practice, the trial court has this
authority."° The methods for augmenting the
record are varied, ranging from the ancient
common-law method of suggesting diminution of
the record,' to a stipulation of the parties or
simple motion requesting leave to file the additional
portions of the record.1 Reasons for the addition
must be assigned, but this amounts to little more
than advising the court that the case cannot be
properly adjudicated without the additions.
PRESENTING THE APPEAL
Once the mechanical tasks of perfecting the
appeal have been completed, appellate counsel is
faced with the task for which he was actually re-
tained-presenting his client's case to the reviewing
court in winning fashion. There are no rules or
statutes which tell counsel how that can be done
but a plethora of hints can be gleaned from these
sources as well as from decided cases.
First, courts are emphatic in their demand that
counsel provide an adequate summary of the record
for the purpose of deciding the issues raised on
appeal and to spare the court the burden of search-
ing through the entire record." There are any
number of methods for meeting that obligation."
papers accompanied by his affidavit that they are true
and correct copies. Cf., Fan. R. App. P. 9(b).
60 RED. R. App. P. 10(e); ItL. S. CT. R. 329.61See, e.g., Chakeres v. Merchants & Mechanics
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 117 Ohio App. 324,
192 N.E.2d 323 (1962).
6FED. R. App. P. 10(e); Itt. S. CT. R. 329.
6See, e.g., Campbell v. Fazio, 23 Ill. App. 2d 106,
161 N.E.2d 579 (1959).
"Dramatic change in substantive law has affected
procedure as well, and the requirement that the record
be summarized has been altered. As a consequence, it
is necessary that counsel continuously check to deter-
mine the form of summarization that is required or per-
mitted by the reviewing court, and whether summariza-
tion is even required at all.
An abstract is one form of summary in which the
testimony of each witness is converted from
question and answer form into a narrative account
of the facts related by that witness. But the record
is not all testimony of witnesses; likewise the
abstract is not entirely a narrative account of
facts. Technically, the abstract is the pleading in
the reviewing court. What is sought to be reviewed
must be contained therein. 5 Thus, the abstract
must also set forth, in verbatim or encapsulized
form, those portions of the proceedings in the trial
court which are necessary to present fully every
error relied upon-e.g., pleadings which are to be
the focus of an issue raised in the brief and specific
objections and rulings thereon, or prejudicial
comments by opposing counsel.
Some jurisdictions, however, require theprepara-
tion of an appendix rather than an abstract."8
This form is distinguished by a verbatim account
of the pertinent portions of the record rather than a
narrative account, although in many instances it is
sufficient to narrate or even paraphrase less im-
portant matters. Nevertheless, the appendix
basically consists of a verbatim recitation of the
essential facts and proceedings which must be
brought to the attention of the reviewing court.
Both the appendix and the abstract may be
distinguished from other methods of summariza-
tion by one principal factor: although summariza-
tions, they purport to tell the total story of the
proceedings in the trial court.67 That story must be
65 Gage v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 109, 71 N.E. 877
(1904).
66See, e.g., former SEVENTa CiR. R. 10(b), 28
U.S.C.A., which also permitted the evidence to be ab-
stracted or reduced to narrative form. This rule has
been superseded by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and especially Rule 30. As a consequence,
there is presently no provision in the Federal Rules, or
in the rules of the various circuits, permitting a party
to file an appendix to which the evidence is abstracted
or reduced to narrative form.
7Most rules contain a statement such as:
Matters in the record on appeal not necessary for a
full understanding of the question presented for
decision shall not be abstracted. The abstract need
only be suffcient to present fully every error relied
upon.
It. S. CT. R. 342(e) (4). As a practicalmatter most ab-
stracts and appendices are composed with an emphasis
placed on the word "fully." An appendix drawn under
Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules, which directs that the
ppendix contain "parts of the record to which the
pris wish to direct the particular attention of the
court," would not purport to tell the total story of the
proceedings in the trial court. And the parties need not
be concerned lest they omit some important aspect of
the proceedings, for "Ilthe fact that parts of the record
are not included in the appendix shall not prevent the
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told in a concise," accurate 69 and yet illuminating0
manner.
Without question the abstract/appendix method
parties or the court from relying on such parts." FED.
R. App. P. 30(a). See FED. R. App. P. 30(b), which
reads:
In designating parts of the record for inclusion in
the appendix, the parties shall have regard for the
fact that the entire record is always available to
the court for reference and examination and shall
not engage in unnecessary designation.
See also ILL. S. CT. R. 342 (g). But see F s Cim. R.
3(c).
68 While the abstract must be sufficiently detailed to
supply the court a clear picture of what happened, it
is also a summarization and therefore must tell the story
concisely. That objective is not difficult to reach. All
counsel need keep in mind are the requirements of the
court and the issues which he intends to raise in his
brief. Unless a question as to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence is to be presented, a full exposition of the evidence
is not necessary. FED. R. App. P. 30(a); lIz. S. CT. R.
342(e) ("if the record contains the evidence it shall be
condensed in narrative form so as to present clearly and
concisely its substance").
One word of caution is necessary. Many jurisdictions
require that specific portions of the record be included
in the abstract as a prerequisite to raising certain issues.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 370 F.2d 495, 496
(9th Cir. 1966), People v. Donald, 27 IlL.2d 289, 194
N.E.2d 227 (1963). In these jurisdictions it is possible
to abbreviate oneself right out of court, unless proper
steps are taken to excuse a failure to include the required
material.
A method by which this omission may be excused is
a motion to dispense with the required matter made
prior to filing the summarization. In it counsel should
advise the court of the material which he feels should be
omitted, his reasons for suggesting the omission, and
why omission of this material will not hinder or other-
wise improperly influence the issue to be decided.
69 If the abstract/appendix is not accurate, it is worse
than no abstract at all. Aside from imposing a burden
on the reviewing court, the inaccurate abstract offers
the court little reason to place any confidence in the ac-
curacy of counsel's brief.
Accuracy, however, means more than just a faithful
summarization of the proceedings. It means that counsel
has made the effort to place everything in context; that
where portions of the record have been set forth ver-
batim, he has indicated omissions by proper ellipses;
that where complaint is made concerning the conduct
of the prosecutor or the trial judge, he has set forth any
and all conduct by the defense attorney that may be
said to have provoked and justified the challenged con-
duct. Nothing reveals more to a reviewing court about
the quality of the defendant's appeal than to have the
appellee point out, by a supplementary abstract, that
appellant's counsel has distorted the record.
70 Too often counsel misses the opportunity to point
up the full flavor of the case where it may bear on the
issues to be presented. Hence, counsel may want to
point out that a continuance was granted prior to trial
because of pretrial publicity, not to support a charge of
prejudice in that publicity, but merely to add weight to
a charge that he was restricted in voir dire or that the
jury was not selected with the care that the nature of the
case required. See, e.g., People v. Kurth, 34 Ill.2d 387,
216 N.E.2d 154 (1966).
of summarizing the record is costly, time consuming
and arduous. The modem trend is to do away with
it. Basically, one of two methods may be substi-
tuted, according to the laws of the particular
jurisdiction in which the appeal is being taken.
Summarization may be dispensed with altogether,7'
or the parties may be permitted to designate and
file "excerpts" from the record proper Some
jurisdictions permit a choice between filing the
more conventional abstract/appendix or following
one of the procedures for dispensing with the
summary. In those jurisdictions, the decision
counsel makes may well affect the outcome of his
appeal.
No one can possibly enumerate all of the factors
that go into the choice of whether to file a summary
and, if so, what type to file. As a general rule,
however, if counsel intends to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, or to urge matters de-
pendent upon a careful analysis of the evidence,
one of the more conventional forms should be
selected, provided the particular jurisdiction allows
a choice. In these cases, the abstract, which pro-
vides a narrative summary of the essential evi-
dence, is the most useful and effective method for
understanding and presenting an intelligible
recitation of the evidence.
The practice of filing excerpts from the record
rather than the more formal abstract/appendix has
found increasing favor in some jurisdictions. 74 The
advantage with the excerpt practice is that it
involves the filing of one document which contains
only those portions of the record essential for the
reviewing court to read in order to decide the issues
presented. Though an abstract may illustrate the
total injustice of the trial, it contributes to the
effort, time and cost in preparation of an appeal.
Furthermore, the finished product invariably
contains a bulk of material which will never be
directly referred to in the brief and argument.
Excerpts obviate all of this. The secret is in the
mechanics.
The appellant, in jurisdictions permitting or
requiring excerpts, does not compose this "sum-
mary" of the record before writing his brief and
argument. The brief is written first. In doing so,
pages of the record are referred to directly for sup-
porting citations. The appellant then files, con-
71 FEn. R. App. P. 30(f); IrL. S. CT. R. 342(i).
nILm. S. CT. R. 342 (a); cf. FED. R. Aip. P. 30(b)
and (c).73See, e.g., TLz. S. CT. R. 342(e).74Id.
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currently with his brief, a designation of those
portions of the record which he intends to repro-
duce as excerpts for the court's use--in practice,
those pages of the record to which he has referred
in the brief. He does not, however, reproduce these
portions until both parties have finally designated
those portions of the record necessary to the
determination of the case. The appellant then
reproduces the pages of the record which have been
designated 5 The advantages of summarizing the
record in this manner are self evident. Speed,
economy and absolute minimization of the record
are obtained.
In the federal practice, Rule 30(c) of the new
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that
unless a particular circuit has established a con-
trary rule an appellant by order of court may defer
filing of the appendix until all briefs have been
filed. The rule is an exception, however, to the gen-
eral practice described in Rule 30(b) and, while the
content of the appendix is the same under both
provisions, the manner in which each is to be pre-
pared is different. Both procedures depart from the
older abstract/appendix method and move toward
the newer excerpt method.
The key procedural change effected by these
Rules is the elimination of the possibility that more
than one appendix will be filed by the parties.
Formerly, it was permissible, in all but two of the
eight circuits using the appendix method, for both
parties to file an appendix 8 The Rules now
establish a procedure whereby only one appendix
may be filed77 thereby eliminating both confusion
and added labor. The parties must either agree on
the contents of the appendix, or designate the
segments of the record to be included therein prior
to filing the appendix. The appellant must serve
his designation on the appellee within ten days
after the record is filed in the reviewing court, and
the appellee must serve his designation, if any,
within ten days thereafter. To assist appellee in
making this decision, the appellant must also serve
a statement of the "issues which he intends to
present for review" at the time of serving the
designation 8 And, as a further inducement toward
brevity, the parties are specifically reminded that
the entire record is available to the court for
75 ILL. S. CT. R. 342(e). The similarity to the practice
under Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules should be noted.78 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Rule 30(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
77 Id.
78 FED. R. Ap. P. 30(b).
reference. 9 This latter provision alleviates any
fear of inadvertent omissions from the designations
or the appendix."0
Rule 30(c) can relieve the burden on appellate
counsel retained shortly before, or even after, the
record has been filed. Under the rule, appellant
may, by order of court, defer preparation of the
appendix until after the briefs for both parties have
been filed. At the time of filing his brief he must
serve upon the government a designation of those
parts of the record which he intends to include
in the appendix. After the government serves its
designation at the time its brief is filed, the appel-
lant has twenty-one days to prepare and file the
appendix, thus giving him an opportunity to add
portions of the record necessary for his reply.
As previously noted, the content of the appendix
and the deferred appendix is the same. To the
extent that they resemble excerpts from the record,
or may be employed in the same manner as
excerpts, they mark a significant trend away from
the practice of lengthy, formal summarization of
the record."
The next task is preparation of the brief. A good
brief is a rare combination of formal averments
and informal statements, claims and concessions,
cold logic and temperate emotionalism. The choice
of subject matter, the method of presentation,
the methods used to capture the minds and imag-
inations of those to whom the work is directed are
79 FED. R. App. P. 30(a) and (b); But see FIRST Cm.
R. 3(c); See generally supra note 74.80 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Rule 30(a), 28 U.S.C.A.8 1 Some jurisdictions permit appellant to dispense
with a summary entirely. Rule 30(f) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 342(1) specifically recognize this practice.
Prior to adoption of the rules, the United States Courts
of Appeal for the Eight and Ninth Circuits dispensed
with the filing of any summary in a criminal case, but
required the appellant to file additional copies of the
record. See Former EIGHT CIR. R. 8(i) & (j), 28
U.S.C.A.; former Nnm CiR. R. 10, 28 U.S.C.A. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed much
the same procedure in cases where the record did not
exceed two hundred pages. See Former OTH CIR. R.
17(a), U.S.C.A.
Since enactment of the Federal Rules, several courts
have dispensed with the appendix in forma pauperis,
habeas corpus or other specific proceedings. See SxcoND
Cm. R. 30; THiRD Cm. R. 10(3); Sixm Cm. R. 10(9);
SEVENT CIR. R. 9; EIGHm CR. R. 8; TENTH CIR. R.
12(a). The District of Columbia and Third Circuits
have provided that an appendix may be dispensed with
in any case upon motion and for good cause. See D.C.
CIR. R. 9(a); TEnlD CiR. R. 10(3) (by implication). The
Ninth Circuit has dispensed with an appendix in all
cases. See Nnura CiR. R. 4.
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all highly individualized, and any attempt to
conform to molds prepared by others must fail.
This does not mean that there are not certain
fundamental techniques which may prove useful
guides.
Every jurisdiction has certain requirements con-
cerning the contents of briefs submitted to its
reviewing courts." The best advice for an attorney
preparing to fle a brief for the first time is to obtain
a copy of the rules of the reviewing court, deter-
mine what formal parts are required in the brief,
obtain a brief previously submitted to and accepted
by the court in order to see how others have fol-
lowed these rules, and then prepare a draft outline
incorporating the matters required.
Even if the applicable rules of court do not re-
quire it, no brief should fail to advise the court of
when and how the prosecution below was brought,
what the charges were, the plea, the court before
whom the case was tried, whether trial was by the
court or jury, the verdicts or findings, and the
judgment and sentence. Opportunities to establish
factual bases for argument in this manner are
limitless.P
For example, where argument is to be made on
the sufficiency of the evidence, or on factual ques-
tions going to the issue of the existence of a con-
spiracy, or on whether the appellant was an ac-
cessory, the fact that co-defendants were acquitted
by the court or jury, or that certain counts were
adjudicated in the appellant's favor, should be
recited. Especially in those jurisdictions where the
reviewing court has the authority to reduce
8See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28; ILL. S. CT. R. 341.
3Except in the federal courts where a statement of
the issues presented for review precedes the statement
of the nature of the case, the statement hereunder can
accomplish much more. If one of the issues to be raised
concerns an alleged denial of appellant's right to a
speedy trial, counsel has for example the opportunity at
the very beginning of his brief to advise the court:
The indictment was returned on April 1 1963, and
appellant was arraigned on April 7, 1963. Demand
for trial was made at this time. No pretrial motions
were interposed, with the exception of a motion to
dismiss the indictment because of the failure of
the State to afford the defendant the speedy trial
guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Article -,
Section - of the Constitution of the State of
Trial was commenced on September 3,
1968, before the Honorable - , judge of
the Circuit Court of -, and a jury.
By this method, counsel has advised the court, con-
cisely and without elaboration, that a claim concerning
denial of a speedy trial is to follow and has established
the factual basis for that argument.
sentences,' lesser sentences imposed on co-
defendants, even if they have not appealed, should
be recounted. A clear statement of the nature of
the case, then, intended to apprise the reviewing
court of the how, when, where and why of the case
below, may be utilized to prepare and condition
the court for some of the arguments that will
appear later in the brief.8
In those states where an appeal may be taken to
one or another reviewing court dependent on the
nature of the issues raised, 8 a statement of the
facts or circumstances giving rise to the jurisdiction
of the reviewing court to hear the appeal is re-
quired. Especially in states such as Illinois, where
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court formerly de-
pended on the existence of a "fairly debatable"
constitutional question, 7 care should be taken to
provide a dear, concise explanation of the basis for
the claim that such a question does exist. Failure
to adequately express the claim in this section may
result in the appeal being transferred to a court of
lesser jurisdiction with resultant expense and delay.
No one segment of the brief deserves more
attention than the recitation of the issues presented
for review." Here is the first real opportunity to
present a case to the court. A dull, muddled state-
ment presents the issues, and thus the entire case,
in its worst possible light. An appealing presenta-
tion, on the other hand, invites the attention of the
court by making the issues seem significant and
their disposition below questionable.8
The hypothetical questions raised should be
keyed to the essential facts and circumstances of
the case. They should not be overloaded with so
many details that they seem hardly more than a
synopsis of the case or a summary of the argument.
Indeed, most courts demand brevity in these
statements. The Illinois Supreme Court for in-
stance requires that the issues be stated "without
detail or citation of authorities." 90
84See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 121-9(b)(4)
(1967).85 Illinois requires a statement as to the nature of any
question raised on the pleadings. ILL. S. CT. R. 341
(e)(1).
81 See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 603. Cf., ILL. CoNsT. art.
VI, §4 of the new Illinois Constitution.
87 ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, 55; I.. S. CT. R. 603; People
v. Arbudde, 31 ll.2d 163, 201 N.E.2d 102 (1964). Cf.,
IrL. CoNsT. art. VI, §4 of the new Illinois Constitution.
83 See generally F. B. WIENER, BRIEFING AND Ax-
GUING FEDERAL APPn .S 72-77 (1961), (hereinafter
cited as WENER).
U Id. at 73.
90 ILL. S. CT. R. 341(e)(2). Many of the former rules
of the circuit courts of appeals contained specific direc-
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In order to avoid a violation of this directive,
the relevant facts must be stated fairly and
accurately, without putting the court to the task
of resolving disputed facts or matters of credibility.
The facts should then be related to the legal
proposition asserted.91
Once counsel has composed a satisfactory state-
ment, he should put it away, write his brief, and
then re-examine the statement in the light of the
finished product. If the statement of issues presents
the matters discussed in the argument in a logical
manner and if it presents those matters fairly and
in conformity with the applicable rules, it is
adequate.
Although the rules are not uniform in their
designation of other formal parts, most require
some form of statement of the propositions of law
and citations of authority relied upon. 92 The
statement of the propositions of law tends to
receive little attention in those jurisdictions which
also require a statement of the issues presented for
review. Most practitioners are satisfied with a
truncated version of the latter stated in positive
terms. The list of authorities cited in support of
these propositions, of course, must await final
composition of the argument. This task is almost
tives on how to prepare the statement of the issues pre-
sented for review. See, e.g., Former TcmD Cmt. R.
24(2)(b), which directed counsel to state the issues
... in the briefest and most general terms, without
... particulars of any kind... [the full statement] not
ordinarily [to] exceed 20 lines, [and] never [to] exceed
one page ... ." The Sixth Circuit had formulated per-
haps the most specific directive:
Each question shall be numbered and set forth
separately, in the briefest terms, and whenever
possible, each question must be followed immedi-
ately by a statement as to whether the lower court
answered it 'Yes,' or 'No,' or qualified it, or for
failure to answer it, together with a statement that
appellant contends that it should be answered
'Yes,' or 'No' as the case may be. Each question
stated in the 'Statement of Questions Involved'
shall be complete in itself and intelligible without
specific reference to the record.
Former Sixv Cm. R. 16(2)(a).
91 For example, the claim that the actions of the de-
fendant did not violate the statute under which he was
prosecuted may provoke the question:
[w]hether it is a violation of the Hobbs Act to ex-
tort money from a businessman whose business
depends upon supplies shipped in interstate com-
merce, where the threat of extortion is to injure the
businessman and members of his family physically,
but does not carry with it, express or implied, a
further threat to obstruct delay or affect any aspect
of the business, and the only effect claimed is the
depletion of the assets of the business by reason of
a subsequent payment of money.
9See, e.g., Im. S. CT. R. 341(e) (5); But See FED.
R. APP. P. 28.
ritualistic; the only useful technique that need be
remembered is to list the authorities in the order
of their importance.9'
The conclusion, too, may be considered in this
category of formal parts. Sadly, counsel have on
occasion neglected to request appropriate relief,4
asking, for example, that the case be reversed when
trial errors which would warrant remandment for a
new trial were the only issues raised.
These preliminary sections of the brief lead to
the statement of facts. Whether by direction, or
otherwise, a statement of facts is a non-argumenta-
tive recitation of the facts "necessary to an under-
standing of the case" and "relevant to the issues
presented for review." 95 But "non-argumentative"
is not to be confused with sterile, or dreary. Too
often, counsel, in their desire to avoid argumenta-
tion, present a statement of facts which reflects
these vices. If the statement of facts is dull, the
reviewing court will probably soon lose interest in
the argument which follows despite its merits.
The interest of the court in a statement of facts
must not be gained at the expense of accuracy. The
statement of facts is the reviewing court's first
encounter with appellant's presentation. If the
statement lacks accuracy, little faith can be placed
in the argument that follows. In short, if counsel
cannot be relied upon to present the facts ac-
curately, he will not be relied upon to present the
law accurately. An inadvertent or unintentional
mistake will not prejudice an otherwise meritorious
argument, but a mistake of some magnitude will
open the way for the appellee to divert the court's
attention from the merits of the argument by
suggesting that the facts have been tailored to fit
the argument. To avoid inaccuracy, counsel should
pay particular heed to those provisions in the
various rules requiring "appropriate references to
the record" (or summary) as supportive authority
for recitations of fact.96
The statement of facts should serve as a preface
for the arguments to come. But, in drafting an
interesting statement, counsel must avoid argu-
mentation.Y The line between effective advocacy
93 Cf. IL. S. CT. R. 341(e)(5). Federal rule 28 re-
quires only that the brief contain a table of cases, alpha-
betically arranged; other authorities cited; and a refer-
ence to the pages of the brief where they have been
cited. Fm. R. App. P. 28(a)(1).
94See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5); Iii. S. CT. R.
341(e) (8).
"IL.. S. C. .. 341(e)(6); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(3).16 FED. R.. APi'. P. 28(a)(3); Imn S. CT. R. 341(e) (6).
97 See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 341 (e) (6).
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and argumentation is thin indeed, but there are
distinct limits that should be observed. For
instance, it is improper in the statement to argue
that a certain prosecution witness is "unbe-
lieveable," yet it is within the bounds of propriety
to point out at a convenient place in the recitation
of his testimony that the witness admitted testify-
ing in hope of reward. Again, it is improper to
argue that a prosecution witness could not observe
the matters about which he testified, but it is
proper to relate those circumstances under which
the witness made his observations. In essence then,
argumentation is the vice of drawing personal
conclusions about a witness, or his testimony,
while advocacy is the art of marshalling and
detailing facts which will lead the court to the
same conclusions.
Choice of phrases is important in this task. If a
witness has testified that the defendant said or did
something which the defendant disputed, a recita-
tion that the witness so "testified" or "claimed",
even if the bulk of the statement is in narrative
form, is attention-catching. When immediately
contrasted with testimony in which the appellant
and his witnesses "denied" or "contradicted" the
version, or when it is pointed out that circum-
stances made the version impossible or improbable,
it proves especially effective. A word of caution is
necessary, however. These conclusionary terms
must be substantiated by an immediate recitation
of the contradictory evidence."
The goal here remains an "integrated" state-
ment of facts. One should attempt to present a
chronology of events as distinguished from a wit-
ness-by-witness summary of testimony. Artis-
tically, the integrated statement is apt to be more
interesting and intelligible. A witness' testimony is
not always confined to a specific portion of the
A more subtle technique consists in using the con-junctives "although" or "even though" to describe im-
probabilities. Thus:[t]he arresting officer claimed the defendant ad-
mitted participation in the holdup immediately
upon being confronted by the victim (Abst. ),
even though the victim himself (Abst. ____),
Officer Brown who was present at the time (Abst.
_ ), and the defendant (Abst. - ) all denied
any admission was made and even though the ar-
resting officer's official report, made that same
night, failed to contain any mention of such an
admission, (Abst. _ ).
This one sentence could challenge the witness' credibil-
ity without argumentation and warn the reader that
anything related by the witness ought to be subject to
careful scrutiny. With appropriate references to the
abstract included, the court stands advised that the
record fully supports the implied incredulity.
facts; nor do witnesses always testify in an order
which conforms to the chronology of events under-
lying the case. Setting forth the facts as they
transpired, rather than as they were recited in the
courtroom, spares the court difficulty in picking up
the trend of events. The integrated statement holds
the further advantage of providing a structure
wherein claims and denials, probabilities and
improbabilities, and conflicting testimony may be
juxtaposed. 99
Some attorneys tend to minimize the importance
of the statement of facts. They argue, not without
some degree of persuasion, that the statement
should briefly apprise the reviewing court of the
essential facts and circumstances of the case and
that all attempts to persuade the court should be
strictly confined to the argument portion of the
brief. They reason that any attempt to "condition"
the court in the statement of facts must necessarily
11 An illustration may prove useful in describing the
differences in strategy. In United States v. Amabile, 395
F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), the appellant, charged with a
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, claimed that the
evidence did not support the charge of conspiracy and
that his conduct did not violate the statute since his
threat of exfortion held no reasonable causal relation to
interstate commerce. To condition the court for these
arguments, the appelant's statement of facts was pre-
sented in an integrated form highlighting two essential
factors: (1) the only agreement entered into by ap-
pellant and the co-defendants was a plan designed to
obtain money from the victim by false pretenses; the
eventual threat of extortion was made by appellant
alone without the knowledge or concurrence of his con-
federates in the fraudulent scheme; (2) the threat of ex-
tortion was not directed against the business of the
victim, but only against his person. Appropriate
"heads" were used to segregate the evidence depicted
thereunder. The motive was to isolate the charged
threat from other facts showing the participation of the
co-defendants with appellant in a fraudulent scheme,
and from other threats by appellant over the course of a
number of years.
Government counsel, on the other hand, claimed that
the defendants had "embarked on a criminal venture ofindefinite outline" and were criminally responsible for
appellant's threat against the victim's person. He ar-
gued that the victim's response to the threat against his
person-the payment of money-depleted his business
assets and thereby "affected" commerce within the
meaning of the statute. But he also wisely realized that
the testimony given by the three principal government
witnesses presented in a witness-by-witness fashion
would divert proper focus from the events immediately
connected with the charged threat of extortion thereby
obscuring the rather narrow issues drawn by appellant.
Thus, even though expressly conceding the sufficiency
of appellant's statement of facts, he took the unusual
course of presenting a statement of facts on behalf of the
government in witness-by-witness form. The measure
of success for each of the respective tactics of counsel is
evidenced by the divided opinion of the Court of Ap-




result in an extended discussion of the evidence
and, consequently, argument on the facts will be-
come repetitive at a loss to its force. This need not
be so. As one acknowledged expert has noted,
The greatest mistake any lawyer can make, after
he has written a fine brief on the law, is to toss in a
dry statement of facts and send the thing off to the
printer.... [in writing briefs, the facts should
first be studied, mastered, sweated over--and writ-
ten out into an acceptable draft before the rest of
the brief is even touched. 10'
In addition, the statement of facts "should
always be written in such a way as to advance the
cause of the party on whose behalf it is pre-
pared." 101 To do this the statement should-within
the confines of the rules-offer the court a basis for
accepting the appellant's version of the facts of the
case even though a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence is not intended. The reason for this is
clear: if the reviewing court gains the impression
that the evidence against appellant was "over-
whelming", rejection of his arguments is apt to
follow as a result of the "harmless error" rule."'
Conversely, if the court can be conditioned to
accept the proposition that there is ". . . a reason-
able possibility that the... [error] complained of
might have contributed to the conviction," 103 or
that, but for the intervening error, the jury might
have returned a different verdict,14 the appellant's
cause has been greatly advanced.
By the time counsel is ready to write his argu-
ment, he should be thoroughly steeped in the facts
of the case. That is the principal reason why com-
position of the statement of facts is recommended
prior to composition of the argument. Mr. Justice
Brandeis, it is said, adhered to a belief in the pri-
macy of facts in dealing with every case.
However much he encouraged his law clerks to
present the results of their legal research in a form
which might be directly useful in drafting an opin-
ion, he took on himself the burden of drafting the
100 Wi .NEi at 44.
101 Id. at 46.
102 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111; FED. R. Ca m. P. 52(a);
Txr. S. CT. R. 615(a); United States v. Granello, 365
F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Hopkins, 76
Ill. App. 2d 350, 222 N.E.2d 85 (1966).
11Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963); see
also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946);
People v. Sumner, 92 Ill.App.2d 386, 234 N.E.2d 537
(1968).
104 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 218 (1946);
People v. Walker, 84 IUl.App.2d 264, 266-68, 228
N.E.2d 597, 598 (1967).
statement of facts. This was his private assurance
that he would not be seduced by the fascination of
legal analysis until he had grounded himself in the
realities of the case as they were captured in the
record."'o
The first step in drafting the argument is to
select those issues worthy of presentation. There
are only two real aids to assist in this task: counsel's
own legal instincts and his faculty for inventive-
ness. This seeming disregard for the traditional
methods of legal research and the principles of
stare decisis deserves explanation.
Theoretically, cases are appealed because the
defendant, in some respect, did not receive a fair
trial.1"' Thus, while some today claim that the
courts are "soft" on criminals, in many respects
the present trend is to overlook insubstantial errors
which in years past would have warranted re-
mandment of the case for a new trial,"°7 and to
insist on substance (that is, prejudice) as the
criteria for reversal.1 8 As a consequence, little
confidence should be placed in the traditional
assertions of error such as claims that the trial
court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask
leading questions or in admitting hearsay evidence.
Conversely, a great deal of faith should be placed
in assignments of error based on claims that the
appellant was prejudiced at trial. Counsel may not
always find a specific expression in the case law
establishing that a particular occurrence has been
recognized as reversible error. That is where in-
stinct enters to aid in selecting points to be argued.
From there counsel should determine how the
incident or evidence prejudiced his client and then
research the law. If the law conforms to his
instincts, writing the argument should be a rela-
tively simple task. If it does not, inventiveness
must be employed to show why the law should be
changed,1"9 or, at least, why it should not apply in
that particular case." °
"'5 p. FaEUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUi?REmE
CouRT 50 (1949).
"' Cf. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957);
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 202 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
"° See, e.g., Whitesides v. People, 1 IIl. 21 (1819),
indictment, which did not specify whether offense com-
mitted in "A.D." or "B.C." held faulty.
"'8 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
202 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); People v.
Hill, 17 Ill.2d 112, 160 N.E.2d 779 (1959); State v.
Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962).
"'1 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"' Compare People v. Bedard, 11 IU.2d 622, 145
N.E.2d 54 (1957) with People v. Siciliano, 4 Ill.2d 581,
123 N.E.2d 725 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931 (1955).
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There is one extrinsic aid in this task of selecting
issues. Most jurisdictions require, in some way,
that trial counsel list those errors occurring during
the course of the case that warrant a new trial nl
These post-trial motions provide on-the-scene
impressions of the errors in the case as distinguished
from later impressions gleaned from the "cold
record." These motions also serve a more funda-
mental function for the appellate lawyer. Or-
dinarily, errors not raised during the course of the
trial cannot be raised on appeal."' Many jurisdic-
tions extend this general rule and require that these
errors be made the subject of post-trial motions.ns
Appellate counsel cannot ignore these rules in
selecting points to argue.
He can, however, seek to circumvent them. The
vehicle for doing this is often referred to as "plain
error," n4 but whether a particular jurisdiction has
a statutory "plain error" provision or not, errors
of magnitude will not be ignored by a reviewing
court merely because trial counsel failed to object
or to make them the subject of a post-trial motion.
An expression of this principle may be found in
People v. Burson"5 where the Illinois Supreme
Court, before Illinois had a "plain error" statute,
reversed and remanded for an error not raised on
appeal. In so doing, the Court carefully examined
the foundations of a reviewing court's ultimate
power to consider all errors appearing on the face
of the record:
We recognize that counsel for defendant did not
present or argue this point; and that the general
rule is that where a question is not raised or re-
served in the trial court, or where, though raised
in the lower court, it is not urged or argued on ap-
peal, it will not be considered and will be deemed to
have been waived. However, this is a rule of admin-
istration and not of jurisdiction or power, and it
will not operate to deprive an accused of his consti-
tutional rights of due process. The court may, as a
matter of grace, in a case involving deprivation of
luSee, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 116-1 (1967);
People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441, 207 N.E.2d 76 (1965);
People v. Orr, 24 Ill.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 501 (1962).
u United States v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955)- United States v.
Jones, 204 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 19531; People v. Carter,
76 Il1. App. 2d 323, 22 N.E.2d 91 (1966); People v.
Fleming, 54 1l. App. 2d 457, 203 N.E.2d 716 (1965);
People v. Pike, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656 (1962).
u" See supra note 111.
W See, e.g., FED. R. CRwn. P. 52(b); Ir. S. CT. R.
615(a); Pinkard v. United States, 240 F.2d 632 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); People v. Bell, 61 Ill. App. 2d 224, 209
N.E.2d 366 (1965).
u11 11 l.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957).
life or liberty, take notice of errors appearing upon
the record which deprived the accused of substan-
tial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial,
although no exceptions were preserved or the ques-
tion is imperfectly presented."'
Power and disposition are two different matters,
however, and, as the Illinois court recognized,
reviewing courts are rarely disposed toward con-
sidering errors not argued on appeal."7
Counsel should avoid argument upon errors
which cannot be said to have prejudiced his client.
A useful standard in designating such errors is the
"harmless error" rule"8 announced in Chapnnan v.
California:'" "... before a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the court must be able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." While this standard was de-
signed expressly for testing the significance of
"constitutional errors, ' ' 20 and is not to be con-
fused with the more stringent standard adopted in
Kotteakos v. United States' for testing the effect of
nonconstitutional errors, it does serve as a useful
guide by which counsel may decide whether or not
to assert a point.
In short, where a number of substantial issues
are available, it makes good sense not to dilute the
effect of these by adding marginal ones. The length
of briefs is generally regulated by rule,1"' and
counsel takes the risk of wasting space on tenuous
points that would best be allocated to stronger
arguments.
In framing arguments, the goal is to establish
that appellant was prejudiced and that settled
principles of law have condemned or should con-
demn such prejudice. The argument depends upon
facts. If an adequate statement of facts-one
which moves the reviewing court in the defend-
n6People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 370-71, 143
N.E.2d 239, 245 (1957).
"7 See Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545,
571-72 (8th Cir. 1962); People v. Smith, 404 I1. 125,
88 N.E.2d 444, 449 (1949).
1FzD. R. Cmri. P. 52(a); IrLL. S. CT. R. 615(a).
f 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
"0See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
"'328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946):
And the question is, not were they right in theirjudgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon
the verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or
reasonably may be taken to have had upon thejury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of
the thing done wrong on the minds of other men,
not on one's own in the total setting.
"'See, e.g., F. R. App. P. 28(g) (briefs shall not ex-
ceed 50 printed or 70 duplicated pages); Ir. S. CT. R.




ant's favor-has been prepared, the argument sec-
tion is the place to consolidate and move ahead.
It is not necessary to restate the facts, but they
must be argued and this can be best accomplished
by reasserting particular facts to show in detail
the degree of prejudice suffered by the appellant.
If, for example, the issue concerns the admission
of irrelevant evidence, counsel should show how
the prosecutor utilized this evidence in his argu-
ment to the jury. Counsel should further point
out that under the instructions given by the court,
the jury improperly considered this evidence and
reached improper conclusions.
Once this foundation has been established, the
applicable law may be infused into the argument.
Citations to authority are intended to show the
reviewing court that it, or another court, on a
previous occasion, has handed down a ruling which
directly, or in principle supports the appellant's
claims. But despite stare decisis, former rulings
are always subject to modification,123 revisionp
or disregard. As a consequence, counsel should rely
more on the facts of the case than on a string of
decisions which seemingly support his arguments
in principle.
Effective citations, then, depend less on lengthy
quotations from supporting authorities and more
on the holdings of those authorities as they are
particularly applicable to the facts of the case.
For example, to demonstrate that a particular
statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is most effective
to point out that the statute in issue applies "to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial," 125 and, by appropriate introductory
signals, show that this is the test established by
prior decisions of the Supreme Court.' Quoting
lengthy passages from each of these authorities to
explain why the statutes questioned in each were
Bills of Attainder would not be helpful. The court
knows that the statutes in these cases were con-
demned as Bills of Attainder; what it wants to
know is why the statute in question should be
similarly condemned.
m Compare Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)
with Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).1
1
4 Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) with
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); compare Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) with Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).2 See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333(1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277
(1866).
At times, however, a lengthy quote cannot be
avoided. This is especially true when the reviewing
court is being urged to abandon its own former
holding on a certain point and adopt that of an-
other jurisdiction. Usually, the language of the
latter decision is self-sustaining and so compelling
that to urge the proposition without setting forth
the supporting language of the court which first,
or most strongly, espoused it, may be ineffective.
Here it is best to remember that reviewing courts
place more reliance on the expressions of other
courts than on the words of counsel.
It is, on occasion, necessary to preface an argu-
ment with a statement of applicable law. An argu-
ment based on a specific interpretation of a statute
might well be prefaced by a resume of existing law
which requires interpretation in the manner
claimed. Here there is no need for lengthy quota-
tions. A statement of law, followed by an applica-
ble citation, and followed in turn by derivative
statements of law and citations is most effective
except for the rare occasion where all of the ap-
plicable law is found in one decision."'
For purposes of brief writing, it is significant to
note that "authorities" are only those decisions of
the court to which the appeal is being directed, or
of courts of superior jurisdiction in the context of
the issue being presented. Other decisions are
"persuasive," "advisory," or "illustrative." A
decision of United States Court of Appeals of one
circuit is not binding on a Court of Appeals for
another.m Neither, except in the most unusual
circumstances,2 9 is it binding on a state court.
m There is only one proper form for citations and
that is the form prescribed by the rules of court. It is
unusual for a reviewing court to impose drastic sanc-
tions for a failure to observe these rules, but such a
failure may prove enough of an annoyance to cause a
reviewing justice subconsciously to pay less attention
to the offending brief than he otherwise would.
The improper use of introductory signals may have
a more noticeable effect on the outcome of an appeal.
The truth of this statement becomes apparent when, in
the reply brief or on oral argument, counsel is called
upon to explain why he has cited a particular case as
authority for a proposition of law when all he meant to
assert was that, rather then being stated therein, the
proposition would be supported or suggested by an
examination of the cited authority. The explanation
could have been avoided merely by using the signal
"see" before the citation. A Uiuom Sys= op CITA-
mON § 26:1 (11th ed. 1967).
12 See, e.g., Affronti v. United States, 221 F.2d 150,
152 (8th Cir. 1955), affd, 350 U.S. 79 (1955). Indeed, a
conflict between circuits is a ground for grant of certio-
rari.
129 Cf, People v. Kurth, 34 1ll.2d 387, 394-96, 216
N.E.2d 154, 157-58 (1966).
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Naturally, counsel will not always be able to
find a decision that is absolutely authoritative. He
will then have to resort to decisions of a "second-
ary" character. His sources for those decisions de-
pend a great deal on the attitude of the court to
which the appeal is directed. Every court tends to
rely on decisions of certain courts more than others.
It would be less than realistic to assume that courts
and individual judges do not have a similar tend-
ency to react more favorably to decisions authored
by judges who, over the years, have gained respect
for their judicial abilities. Decisions from these
sources should naturally be accorded primacy.
Commentators and text writers are not "au-
thorities" in this strict sense of the term. Although
courts may occasionally rely on these sources to
support a particular holding,1 0 counsel is better
advised to limit his references to them. When
utilized, however, it is advisable to show that the
general statements of the commentator cited have
found recognition in decided cases."'
Arguments in a brief should be devoid of exces-
sive emotionalism. Rash, exaggerated statements
and ominous warnings do little to further an argu-
ment. Courts of review are comprised of men with
years of legal experience; they have all heard of
the "dangers inherent in permitting the prosecutor
to run roughshod over the rights of a defendant;"
what they want to know is why the proceedings
in the case under review were unfair. Similarly,
unless counsel is prepared to prove that "no court
in the civilized world would permit the prosecutor
to argue as he argued here," 1 he is much better
advised to show why the argument prejudiced the
defendant and how other courts would have con-
demned identical or similar arguments.
There is a more practical reason for avoiding
such statements. They invite the response of op-
posing counsel, and provide a fertile climate in
which he can develop his own arguments. Cold
10 See, e.g., People v. Kurth, 34 fll.2d 387, 394-95,
216 N.E.2d 154, 158 (1966).
1Occasionally, a law review article or similar pro-
fessional exposition will serve as the inspiration for a
change in existing law. If that is the aim of counsel's
argument, he may find citation of such articles effective.
But there is a danger in relying too heavily on these
writings. Law review articles reach conclusions which
the authors have drawn from their consideration of a
number of cases. The temptation is great to refer to the
article alone in urging adoption of these conclusions and
leave the analysis of prior decisions to the authors, and
to the court.
= See Gurinsky v. United States, 259 F. 378 (5th
Cir. 1919).
hard fact contrasted against hyperbole is effective.
The more extravagant the hyperbole--if such is
possible-the more persuasive a contrasting fac-
tual recitation becomes until it is not even neces-
sary for opposing counsel to draw conclusions. He
can leave them for the court to draw." Hence
examples of emotional attack are rare, but, when
they do occur, they evoke immediate response
either from opposing counsel in the form of a
motion to strike the offending brief,"4 or from the
court in the form of an explicit censure," ' or
worse.j 6
In addition, the appellate advocate simply can-
not afford to mislead the court either as to the
status of the law or the facts in a case. That does
not mean, however, that he must labor to negate
all possible exceptions to a.proposition which he
proposes. For example, when urging that a closing
argument was prejudicial, it is not always neces-
sary to establish that defense counsel did not pro-
voke such argument in his closing remarks. This
is especially true where defense counsel has invited
some form of response, but the offending argument
went beyond the bounds of legitimate replyYB If
the summarization of the record sets forth the
arguments of both counsel fairly, there is no need
for the appellant to shoulder the burden of proving
a negative-that his closing argument did not
justify the prosecutor's.
This is equally true with respect to qegal"
arguments. If counsel urges the adoption of a
position taken by another jurisdiction, he is
morally obligated to advise the reviewing court of
the existence of a contrary position taken by it,
or that the rule advocated does not represent the
majority view. Candor in this circumstance makes
good sense. But authorities which, by way of ex-
ception, differ from those advanced in support of
an argument need not be recounted unless the
applicability of that exception is the issue raised
on review. Again, while counsel should not avoid
obvious issues, it is not incumbent upon him to
w See WJxa at 245-56.
m See, e.g., Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918); Green v.
Ebert, 137 U.S. 615 (1891).
135 See, e.g., Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545,
549-55 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Miller, 233
F.2d 171, 172 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
1 See, e.g., Matter of Fletcher, 344 U.S. 862 (1952);
Knight v. Bar Association, 321 U.S. 803 (1944). See
also S. CT. R. 40(5).
"See, e.g., People v. Dukes, 12 fll.2d 34, 341-42,




search out and eliminate every possible exception
to the proposition he advocates.
Counsel, then, must strike a delicate balance
between candor and advocacy. Advocacy has a
definite advantage over candor. A brief which does
not exhibit partiality risks a loss of direction fatal
to any argument.
Above all, it must be remembered that a brief
is not a law review article designed to examine all
available data and arrive at a conclusion. Its func-
tion is to start with a conclusion, and argue its
merits." It cannot perform that function if it does
not have direction and purpose. An erudite exposi-
tion on the law of search and seizure, its history and
its future, is pointless where the only question is
whether or not the defendant consented to the
search. Although the given example may seem
absurd in the abstract, courts everyday consider
arguments which have lost their vitality because
they have been infected by needless side issues.
Abandonment of meritorious or fairly debatable
arguments is not recommended, but there is little
to be gained, and indeed much to be lost, by being
overly contentious.
There is always a great deal of indecision con-
cerning the order in which points in the argument
should be arranged. For instance, if the jurisdic-
tion of the reviewing court depends on the existence
of a fairly debatable constitutional question,
either the rules of court,139 or common sense dictate
that these issues be raised first. But where the rules
do not so require and the constitutional question
is not of principal significance, or where no consti-
tutional question is involved, the general tendency
is to arrange points in their order of strength or
relative importance. While there is nothing particu-
larly wrong with this plan, and indeed much to be
said in its favor, the eventual layout of the argu-
ment may detract from its overall total effective-
ness. When this occurs, an alternative should be
considered.
Arranging the issues in the order in which they
arose or, more importantly, so that they relate one
to the other has the advantage of giving the court
a panoramic view of the manner in which the as-
serted unjustifiable conviction came about. Even
though an issue concerning a particular instruction
to the jury may be the strongest point on appeal,
it is often cumbersome to argue that point without
m Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967);
Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).
139 Compare ILL. S. CT. R. 302(b) with ILL. S. CT. R.
603. Cf. ILL. CONsT. art. VI, §4 of the new Illinois
Constitution.
first elaborating on other matters, especially if
those other points help develop an argument con-
cerning the instruction. Counsel may thus elect to
argue the admissibility of a confession before men-
tioning the failure to instruct concerning the weight
to be given it, even though the latter is the stronger
argument.14' Here the first argument establishes a
predicate for the second by detailing the circum-
stances under which the confession was obtained,
a matter which the jury must be given an oppor-
tunity to consider and, consequently, about which
they must be properly instructed.
One important rule must be observed in struc-
turing the argument. A weak point, or one which
does not have the capacity to stimulate the court's
interest, should never be argued first. But such
points, even though relegated to lower rank, should
be related to other points. The seemingly innocuous
admission of hearsay evidence can be made to ap-
pear more significant if it is shown that the ques-
tioned evidence is further reason why a severance
should have been granted appellant from his co-de-
fendants142 Both arguments can be made more ef-
fective by a third argument that the trial court
did not give a proper cautionary instruction in
admitting such evidence' 42 The object is to struc-
ture the argument so that all three issues, perhaps
individually weak, lend support each to the other.
Finally, in framing arguments for cases arising
in the state courts, counsel often fail to assess the
prospects for further appeal, or, more properly,
for a petition for certiorari from the Supreme
Court of the United States should their case be
affirmed. As a result, they neglect to raise the full
spectrum of constitutional rights in their argu-
ments, omitting, for example, to allege violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as a violation of
the applicable provision of the state constitution.
Although the Supreme Court may grant certiorari
despite the failure to raise the federal rights ex-
plicitly in the court below,43 it is equally possible
that it will refuse to consider the issue, or reject the
claimed error, because of such failure.' a Similar
1' See, e.g., People v. Cook, 33 111.2d 363, 211 N.E.2d
374 (1965).
", See, e.g., United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661,
672-73 (7th Cir. 1943).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Guido, 161 F.2d 492,
495 (3d Cir. 1947).
143 Cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965);
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equaliza-
tion & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
14 4 Cf. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 549-54




considerations may apply in jurisdictions having
intermediate courts of review.
Certain arguments are particularly demanding of
special skills---especially those which challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a con-
viction. Legal scholarship, a keen sense of logic,
an ability to be analytical and a faculty for ex-
pressing these talents are all necessary. And,
wherever remotely possible, the assignment should
be undertaken if for no other reason than to dem-
onstrate that, but for intervening trial errors, the
jury could have returned a different verdict 1 5
The principal impediment to such arguments
are the differing attitudes of the courts toward
review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Some
courts openly permit such review 14 A few, limited
by statute or constitutional provision, absolutely
prohibit it."4 Others profess to prohibit it, but in
practice do review the question employing criteria
which are so varied from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion (and even within the same jurisdiction)48
that it is impossible to formulate any definite
statement applicable to all. The problem is further
complicated by the fact that these criteria often
vary according to the nature of the charges in the
cases being reviewed."' As a consequence, an at-
tack on the sufficiency of the evidence must be
charted within the limits of review allowed by the
particular jurisdiction for the particular type of
case on appeal.
There are two types of challenges to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. The first and most difficult
to maintain is that which, in effect, asks the re-
viewing court to resolve conflicts in the evidence
or to substitute its judgment for that of the jury
as to the credibility of witnesses. Although the
challenge itself may be couched in different lan-
guage, it generally rests on the premise that there
was unsatisfactory evidence on the guilt of the
defendant. This type of challenge may succeed in
145 Cf. United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d
35, 39 (7th Cir. 1968).146 See People v. Cullotta, 32 Il1.2d 502, 504-05, 207
N.E.2d 444, 446 (1965); People v. Ikerd, 26 Ill.2d 573,
578-90, 188 N.E.2d 12, 16 (1963).
147 See, e.g., State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So.2d
283, 291 (1962).
148 Cnnpare People v. Cullotta, 32 Ill.2d 502, 207
N.E.2d 444 (1965) with People v. Turner, 91 Ill. App.
2d 436, 235 N.E.2d 317 (1968).149 See, e.g., The Illinois rule with respect to crimes
against children where the prosecution depends prin-
cipaly upon the testimony of the child: People v. Wil-
liams, 414 Ill. 414, 111 N.E.2d 343 (1953); People v.
Pazell, 399 IIl. 462, 78 N.E.2d 212 (1948).
some jurisdictions 1 0 But in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Glasser v. United States' that a
federal reviewing court must view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the govern-
ment,'8 it seldom, if ever, succeeds in the federal
courts.
The second type of attack is directed toward the
technical sufficiency of the evidence and is based
on the premise that the conviction is tainted by the
absence of proof of a material element or by other-
wise incompetent proof. The appellant may assert
a variance between the evidence and the charge;,-'
he may contend that the prosecution failed to
prove a material element, such as ownership of
allegedly stolen property, TM or use of the mails,18 5
or scienter;'56 or he may even contend that the
prosecution failed to establish the requisite plu-
rality of parties to a conspiracy,' m or that it failed
to establish that the defendant on trial was the
person who committed the acts charged in the
indictment and was the person named thereinO
Plainly, this type of argument is not met with the
sort of restriction voiced in Glasser. To the extent
that it does not depend on resolutions of conflicts
in the evidence or weighing the credibility of
witnesses, it is received more readily by reviewing
courts.
The purpose is to obtain a checklist by which the
material elements of the crime and the facts in
evidence are compared. This technique is particu-
larly helpful in conspiracy and complicated fraud
cases wherein appellate counsel must determine
the exact charge against each defendant and the
specific evidence offered in support of each facet
of the charge. This is not always as simple as it
appears, especially in those cases involving sev-
eral defendants, a multiplicity of transactions and
150See, e.g., People v. Cullotta, 32 l.2d 502, 207
N.E.2d 444 (1965); People v. Panczko, 20 Ill.2d 237,
170 N.E.2d 130 (1960).M 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
1
2 Id. at 80. See also United States v. Mins, 340
F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1965).153 See, e.g., United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376
(2d Cir 1964); Cannella v. United States, 157 F.2d 470
(9th Cir. 1946).
154People v. Struble, 275 Ill. 162, 113 N.E. 938
(1916).
155 United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.1955).
156 Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
157Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
168People v. Dante, 35 Ill.2d 538, 221 N.E.2d 409




a conspiracy which is claimed to have more than
one objective.15 9
Having determined which elements were not
proved, where the proof varied from the charge,
or why the conduct disclosed by the evidence did
not amount to a violation of the statute, counsel
should direct his argument to that facet of the
case, conceding that which has been proven. As
elementary as this may seem, too often counsel
attempt to argue the entire factual structure of the
case and lose sight of their real objective.
A different technique must be employed in
arguing that the evidence was unsatisfactory. No
matter what criteria are employed for testing the
sufficiency of evidence at the appellate level,
counsel should approach the problem as though
he held the burden of persuasion and attempt to
convince the court of the probability of defendant's
innocence. It is well to point out that even for a
conviction to stand on appeal circumstantial evi-
dence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt.16 0 As a practical matter, how-
ever, the court should be shown that other hy-
potheses not only exist but are also far more reason-
able. If a key prosecution witness's testimony is
alleged to be unbelievable, it is not enough to
point out a motive or inclination to lie. The court
must be made to believe that the witness did lie-
or at least that the possibility of his having done
so is so great as to render his testimony valueless.' 11
It is, of course, easier to speak of these matters
than to put them into effect. If trial counsel failed
to elicit sufficient facts on cross examination or in
the presentation of defendant's case, little can be
accomplished on appeal. Even where trial counsel
has elicited sufficient facts, there is always a rea-
sonable probability that an attack on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence will be met with the answer:
The credibility of the witnesses and the resolution
of the conflicting testimony was a matter for the
trial court (jury), and this court will not substi-
tute its judgement for that of the trial court
(jury) .1"
Identification cases, too, present a particular
159 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698
(7th Cir. 1966).
160 Dawes v. United States, 177 F.2d 255 (6th Cir.
1949); People v. DeVito, 66 Ill. App. 2d 682, 214 N.E.2d
320 (1966).161 Cf. People v. Quintana, 91 Ill. App. 2d 95, 234
N.E.2d 406 (1968).
162 See, e.g., People v. Woodruff, 9 11.2d 429, 137
-N.E.2d 809 (1956).
problem. Reviewing courts have a tendency to
refer to claims of mistaken identity as challenges
to the credibility of the identifying witness 64 As a
consequence, these claims are often dismissed
with the observation that the "credibility" of the
witness is a matter for the trier of fact. But a claim
that a witness has erred does not involve a chal-
lenge to his veracity. Truthful people make mis-
takes. To assert this point, it is always best to
emphasize the inadequacy of the identification,
the difficult circumstances under which it was
made and the opportunities for mistake'6 It is a
good policy to refrain from suggestions of bias or
other motive for the alleged untruth. Sympathize
with the witness because of the hardships imposed
on him by the circumstances, but reject his "conclu-
sion" as based on insufficient data. 65 The reviewing
court may then be persuaded that what it is being
called upon to weigh is the reliability and the ac-
curacy of the witness' conclusion that the man in
court is the man he saw commit the offense, not
the witness' credibility. 66
As the appropriate arguments are devised,
counsel should remember that whether the ap-
plicable rules of court'1 set a limit on the length
of the brief or not, his brief is only one of many
that must be considered by the court at the same
session. Although permission to file an extended
brief may generally be obtained from the reviewing
court prior to filing,"' the courts frown on lengthy
briefs even if they do permit them. The best
admonition is the one found in the Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States, an admonition
which provides a fitting summary of the entire
subject of brief writing:
Briefs must be compact, logically arranged with
proper headings, concise, and free from burden-
some, irrelevant, immaterial, and scandalous mat-
ter. Briefs not complying with this paragraph may
be disregarded and stricken by the court.169
16 3 See People v. Turner, 91 Ill. App. 2d 436, 343-44,
235 N.E.2d 317, 320 (1968); Commonwealth v. Shel-
bert, 404 Pa. 263, 171 A.2d 785 (1961).
164 See, e.g., People v. Cullotta, 32 IHl.2d 502, 207
N.E.2d 444 (1965); People v. McGee, 21 Ill.2d 440,
173 N.E.2d 434 (1961); People v. Peck, 358 IBl. 642,
93 N.E. 609 (1934).
169 People v. Peck, 358 Ill. 642, 349-50, 193 N.E. 609,
612 (1934).
166 People v. Gold, 361 Ill. 23, 196 N.E. 729 (1935).
167 FED. R. App. P. 28(g); Ir.L. S. CT. R. 341(a).
68 FED. R. App. P. 28(g); ILL. S. CT. R. 341(a); see
also EiGni Cix. R. 8(c).




The fundamental question faced by every ap-
pellant in a criminal case is not how to file a reply
brief, but whether to file one at all. The answer is
suggested by the rules of the various courts. Rule
28(c) of the Federal Rules authorizes a brief "in
reply to the brief of the appellee" and, as though to
underscore the fact that this is to be a "reply" and
not a further exposition of the issues, the Seventh
Circuit adds the caveat that it "shall present only
matter in reply to questions discussed in appellee's
brief." 170
If counsel has fully prepared his brief, there are
few situations in which a reply brief need be filed.
One is always necessary when the appellee's brief
contains important misstatements of law or fact.
Minor misstatements, or ones which have no
relevance to the issues at hand, need not always
evoke a reply. Similarly, if the appellee's brief
misinterprets the propositions advanced in the
appellant's brief, it may not be necessary to reply
if the misinterpretation is an obvious attempt to
avoid the issues. If, however, the misinterpreta-
tion is caused by the appellant's lack of clarity in
developing his propositions, then a reply is in
order. A reply is dearly necessary when the ap-
pellee's brief raises issues not covered in appellant's
brief.
One situation not covered by these suggestions
is the emergence of new authority during the period
between the filing of the brief and the receipt of
appellee's brief. The Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States expressly authorize an addi-
tional memorandum at any time--even after oral
argument--should this occur. n By analogy, it
must be assumed that no reviewing court would
disfavor a reply brief that pointed out recent deci-
sions, even if their only import were to lend sup-
port for what was stated in the brief.
From the foregoing, a general rule as to the
content of reply briefs may be developed. The less
said the better. Not only are reviewing courts
already overburdened with too many briefs to
consider, but an extensive reply brief leaves the
1 0 SwN Cm. R. 10; cf. FrsT CiR. R. 3(a), which
states:
An appellant intending to file a reply brief must
notify the clerk of his intent within seven days of
service of appellee's brief.
7 S. CT. R. 41(e). Leave of court is necessary to file
a "supplemental brief" after the case has been called
for hearing.
impression that what was argued originally needs
modification, or additional support.
As a consequence, the reply brief should be
restricted to the purpose for which it is intended.
It should identify the errors or misinterpretations
contained in the appellee's brief with specificity
and make the desired corrections. It should not
restate the premises upon which appellant's argu-
ments are based, or reargue collateral matters.
OFAL AtGIhNT
A case worth appealing merits oral argument.
There can be no deviation from this general propo-
sition. Although the rules of various courts may
assume that there are cases in which briefs will be
filed, and not argued orally,"' the majority of
judges will privately affirm that no criminal case
should be submitted on briefs alone. The reason
perhaps, is psychological, for the attorney who
will not argue his case suggests his own lack of
interest in the appeal.
Although the setting of the docket for oral
argument is a matter of the court's own internal
administration,' some jurisdictions require coun-
sel specifically to request oral argument. Illinois,
for example, requires that counsel state on the
cover of his brief that oral argument is requested,'74
although an inadvertant omission to note this
request certainly will not preclude counsel from
moving to have the cause set for argument. The
tenor of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
assumes that the case will be argued,175 and the
Rules of the Supreme Court, if they may be taken
as an indication of the sentiment throughout the
federal system, disfavor any waiver of argument. 7
The oral argument should thus be viewed as an
integral part of the appellate process and should
be prepared with equal care.
Each jurisdiction has its own rules governing
the conduct of oral argument. As with the prepara-
tion of briefs, counsel cannot begin to prepare his
argument without consulting these rules. For
instance, time is the most jealously guarded
prerogative of the reviewing court. No counsel
should begin oral argument without first having
"'See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. 352(a).
173See, e.g., ITM. S. CT. R. 611(a) and 351; TnmD
Cm. R. 12; Fnrm Cm. R. 11; SECOND CiR. R. 34.
174 ILL. S. CT. R. 352(a).
"76 FED. R. APP. P. 34(f).
176 S. CT. R. 45(1). It should be noted that the Court
may "require oral argument by the parties." See also.
FmsT CIR. R. 4; Firm Cm. R. 11(d) and (e).
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determined how much time the court will allow him
and how the time may be apportioned.'7 No gen-
eral statement as to the time allotted in the various
jurisdictions is possible. Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules allows each "side" 30 minutes for argu-
ment.17 Because the appellant is allowed to open
and conclude the argument,'17 9 it is assumed that
counsel will apportion his time between closing
argument and rebuttal.180 Counsel are permitted
to, apply by letter to the clerk "reasonably in
advance of the date fixed for the argument" for
enlargement of time,D but, although such requests
are to be "liberally granted if cause therefore is
shown," some circuits have intimated that they
will not be favorably viewed.ln Moreover, Rule 34
recognizes that "the court may terminate the
argument whenever in its judgment furthur argu-
ment is unnecessary." 83
Time is usually only a problem when more than
one counsel are to argue from the same side. This
usually occurs when more than one defendant
below was convicted and their separate appeals,
prosecuted by separate counsel, have been consoli-
dated for review, or when a single appeal was filed
on behalf of each defendant but by separate
counsel.M Although the Rules do not so provide,
the Committee Notes to Rule 34 indicate that
multiple defendants having a common interest
"constitute only a single side", and that "the time
allowed by the rule is afforded by opposing in-
terests rather than to individual parties." Separate
counsel representing separate appellants must
therefore request additional time if necessary.
They should, of course, "avoid duplication of
argument." 8 5
177 See, e.g., IL. S. CT. R. 352(b); FED. R. APP. P.
34(b) as implemented by the following circuit rules:
D.C. Cm. R. 12(b); SECOND Cm. R. 34(d); SEVENTH
Cim. R. 11(b); TET CR. R. 11(c).
178 FED. R. APP. P. 34(b); see also IL. S. CT. R.
352(b).
1 FED. R. APP. P. 34(c).
180 Cf. FuRsT CiR. R. 4; IL. S. CT. R. 352(b).
8 FEn. R. APP. P. 34(b).
"'Cf. SEvENrH CiR. R. 11.
1m FED. R. APP. P. 34(b); cf. SEcoND Cm. R. 34(d),
permitting the presiding judge of a panel to shorten the
time for argument after a consideration of the briefs
"if he concludes that a smaller amount of time will be
adequate." See also TENTH CiR. R. 11(c)(6), allowing
fifteen minutes for oral argument of cases assigned to
the "summary" calendar.
"4See FED. R. App. P. 3(b).
16 FED. R. APP. P. 34(d). So too, argument by more
than one counsel on behalf of one appellant should be
avoided. A division of responsibilities can result in a
piecemeal presentation. Time is too short and the argu-
ment too important to permit this distraction. More-
The cardinal rule on oral argument is that "coun-
sel will not be permitted to read at length from
briefs, records or authorities." 8 Counsel may wish
to deviate slightly from this rule in one respect: a
particular passage from the record, either the
testimony of a witness or the comments of the
judge and prosecutor, may be so essential to the
point being argued that it must be repeated
verbatim. In such a case, counsel should identify
the passage, cite where it may be found in the
summary or brief, tell the court he is reading the
passage, explain why he is reading it, and permit
the individual members of the court sufficient time
to locate the passage in their copies of the summary
or brief before he begins his reading. In no other
instance should counsel read anything to the court.
Two other assumptions are necessary in planning
the content of the argument. In the first place,
counsel must assume that the court has not read
the brief and is not familiar with the facts of the
case or the details of the issues raised." Hence,
the facts and the argument on the issues to which
they relate should be presented concurrently."
But in planning, counsel must also assume that
the court is fully aware of the legal principles
urged in support of his arguments. There are
exceptions, of course, as in the case of a newer
principle announced by a different jurisdiction,
but in the main counsel cannot hope to expound
at length on the legal principles involved in the
time available to him.18 Yet, many judges are
fond of inquiring whether the court has ever
adopted a certain principle of law, or whether the
decisions in other cases are controlling in the case
under consideration. To this extent, counsel must
be fully prepared to discuss the decisions by which
the law has been developed.
Every bit of preparation undertaken by counsel
will be to no avail if, on argument, he fails to adopt
a proper attitude toward the case and the court.
The appellate court room, though austere and
formal, is not the place for a bland, dispassionate
discussion of abstractions. It is a place for advocacy
over, apportioning issues between counsel imposes an
undesirable limitation on inquiries from the court.
18 FED. R. App. P. 34(c); see also S. CT. R. 44(1);
In. S. CT. R. 352(c).
8 But see FmsT CiR. R. 4.
' Counsel for the appellant must present the facts
"fairly." See FEn. R. App. P. 34(c); SEVENTH CiR. R.11.
189 Counsel should assume that questions by the court
will take up a significant amount of the time allotted.




and insincerity is the deadliest enemy of winning
advocacy. Counsel should not forget that the
judges who comprise the court have been exposed
to legal arguments for a major portion of their
professional lives. By training, experience and
intelligence they will be the first to detect a lack
of conviction in counsel's presentation, and this
alone can be fatal to an appellant's claims.
So too, counsel must be candid in oral argument.
Candor requires a thorough mastery of the law
and facts and is not to be confused with ill-con-
ceived concessions made out of lack of knowledge
or a desire to ingratiate oneself with the court. Too
often counsel readily concede the validity of a
particular doctrine of law or the applicability of a
particular case because their lack of preparation
has left them poorly equipped to deal with in-
quiries from the bench.
Oral argument is essentially a forum where the
advocates expose themselves to the inquiries of
the court. To face these inquires, to answer them
and to tie together all of the loose ends that may
have been left by the brief are the challenges that
face counsel as he approaches the lecturn. He can
prepare the law and the facts; he cannot prepare
answers to as yet unexpressed problems which
may concern an individual justice.
But he must answer those questions. He cannot
avoid them; he cannot put them off. He is much
better off to openly admit that he does not know
the answer--and promise to find it and advise the
court by the most appropriate means' 9 -than he
is to slough it off or offer an evasive answer.
With the rebuttal portion of the oral argument
comes the best opportunity to answer those ques-
tions posed during the opening argument which
90 It is not uncommon for some appellate court
judges to interrupt an oral argument and inquire why
a complete citation has not been provided the court. It
is accepted, of course, that counsel may not have the
complete citation of a very recent case available at the
time he files his brief.
counsel was not able to answer at that time. In
fact, the rebuttal may also provide time for answer-
ing those questions asked of the appellee which
were not answered, or were answered unsatis-
factorily. This function suggests the proper tenor
for rebuttal. It is not the time to argue matters
contained within the reply brief. They should be
developed, if necessary, during the opening argu-
ment. Concluding arguments should be restricted
to rebuttal of unexpected matters.'9 This encom-
passes questions by the court and new arguments
(or misstatements) by the appellee.
CONCLUSION
A court of review does not act sua sponk. It op-
erates on the presumption that the judgment in
question was properly obtained.' 92 The appellate
lawyer who loses sight of this and does not, in the
preparation and presentation of his appeal, employ
every legitimate method at his disposal to upset
this presumption not only neglects his client's
present interests, but runs the risk of doing very
serious damage to his client's chances for subse-
quent relief. 9"'
But an expertly prepared and presented brief
and oral argument will not affect a conviction
based on sufficient evidence and obtained during
the course of a fair trial in which the defendant
was accorded all of his rights. In the end, the man-
ner in which counsel has faced his task is measured
less by the outcome of the decision than by the
extent to which counsel has provoked the court to
give full and careful thought to each alleged viola-
tion of his client's rights. In the final analysis,
counsel can hope for no more, and the bench and
public can expect no less.
"I FrsT Cm. R. 4; see also ILL. S. CT. R. 352(b).
1'-See Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545, 571-72
(8th Cir. 1962).
1 Cf. United States v. Jonikas, 197 F.2d 675, 678-79
(7th Cir. 1952).
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